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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Municipal Corporations-Tort Liability-Parks and Playgrounds.
Plaintiff's intestate, a small child, died of injuries received while
using a swing in the City of Charlotte's municipal park, and this action
for damages was brought against the city for failure to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of the park. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina held the facts alleged in the complaint were insufficient to determine as a matter of law whether or not the maintenance of the park
was in the exercise of a governmental function, and as a result the
overruling of the defendant's demurrer was proper, since it was based
on the contention that the maintenance of a public park was a governmental function for which the city would have no tort liability.' As
the question of a city's liability for negligence in the operation of a park
was here presented to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for the first
time, it still remains unanswered.
The legal proposition that a municipal corporation is not liable for
its torts in the exercise of a governmental function 2 but is liable for its
torts in the exercise of a proprietary function8 is firmly established.
Pursuant to this doctrine the Supreme Court of North Carolina has held
as governmental functions: the enactment 4 or enforcement r of laws or
ordinances, the maintenance and acts of the fire6 and police 7 departments, the fire and police alarm systems,8 the collection of trash0 and
garbage, ° the operation of incinerators,"1 and the maintenance of pubLWhite v. City of Charlotte, 209 N. C. 573, 183 S. E. 730 (1936).
2This

was first stated in Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng.

Repr. 359 (1798) ; James v. City of Charlotte, 183 N. C. 630, 112 S. E. 423 (1922) ;
Broome v. City of Charlotte, 208 N. C. 729, 182 S. E. 325 (1935) ; 6 McQuiLLiN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2nd ed. 1928) §2793. This rule of non-liability for
torts in exercise of governmental functions does not apply to admiralty courts.
Workman v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 212, 45 L. ed. 314 (1899).
3 Meares v. City of Wilmington, 31 N. C. 74 (1848) ; Munich v. City of Durham, 181 N. C. 188, 106 S. E. 665 (1921) ; 6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(2nd ed. 1928) §2792.
'Harrington v. Town of Greenville, 159 N. C. 632, 75 S. E. 849 (1912).
5
Hull v. Roxboro, 142 N. C. 453, 55 S. E. 351 (1906) (city did not enforce
health ordinance); Goodwin v. City of Reidsville, 160 N. C. 411, 76 S. E. 232
(1912).
'Peterson v. City of Wilmington, 130 N. C. 76, 40 S. E. 853 (1902) ; Harrington v. Town of Greenville, 159 N. C. 632, 75 S. E. 849 (1912) (not liable for negligent acts or omissions of fire department).
Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N. C. 237, 9 S. E. 695 (1889) (not liable for injury
to prisoner by negligence of jailer) ; Mcllhenney v. City of Wilmington, 127 N.
C. 146, 37 S. E. 187 (1900) (plaintiff was brutally arrested by a policeman for no
offence, and court ruled policeman was an agent of the state) ; Hobbs v. City of
Washington, 168 N. C. 293, 84 S. E. 391 (1915).
1 Cathey v. City of Charlotte, 197 N. C. 309, 148 S. E. 426 (1929).
9
Snider v. City of High Point, 168 N. C. 608, 85 S. E. 15 (1915).
"James v. City of Charlotte, 183 N. C. 630, 112 S. E. 423 (1922) (a small
charge was made for service, and truck exceeded speed limit).
2" Scales v. City of Winston-Salem, 189 N. C. 469, 127 S. E. 543 (1925).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
lic buildings. 12 The Supreme Court has classified as proprietaryfunctions to which liability attaches, the maintenance and operation of water L3
and light companies, 14 streets 15 and highways, 16 sidewalks, 17 bridges,' 8
and jails.' 9
Difficulty and confusion arise when the court must decide the character of a new function assumed by municipalities. 20 The two tests
"See Pleasants v. City of Greensboro, 192 N. C. 820, 135 S. E. 321 (1926)
(court assumed the maintenance of city hall was a governmental function).
'Woodie v. Town of North Wilkesboro, 159 N. C. 353, 74 S. E. 924 (1921)
(city owes to its servants and the public the same duty as would a private corporation under like circumstances) ; Munich v. City of Durham, 181 N. C. 188,
106 S. E. 665 (1921) (superintendent of waterworks unjustifiably assaulted plaintiff). A city in no case -is liable for failure to furnish a sufficient supply of either
water or light. N. C. CoDE AiN. (Michie, 1935) §2807; Howland v. City of
Asheville, 174 N. C. 749, 94 S. E. 524 (1917); Mack v. Charlotte City Waterworks, 181 N. C. 383, 107 S. E., 244 (1921).
"Fisher v. New Bern, 140 N. C. 506, 53 S. E. 342 (1906); Harrington v.
Commissioners of Wadesboro, 153 N. C. 437, 69 S. E. 399 (1910) ; Terrell v. City
of Washington, 158 N. C. 282, 73 S. E. 888 (1912) ; Smith v. Commissioners of
Lexington, 176 N. C. 467, 97 S. E. 378 (1918).
Judge Pearson, in Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 31 N. C. 74, 80
(1848) in imposing liability upon the city, stated ".... When the sovereign grants
power to a municipal corporation to grade the streets, the grant is made for the
public benefit, and is accepted because of the benefit which the corporation expects
to derive, not by making money directly, but by making it more convenient for
the individuals composing the corporation or town to pass and repass in the transaction of business and to benefit them by holding out greater inducements for
others to frequent the town and thereby add to its business ... the citizens of the
town derive special benefit from the work, which is not shared by the citizens of
the State. . . ." Johnson v. City of Raleigh, 156 N. C. 269, 72 S. E. 368 (1911) ;
Seborn v. City of Charlotte, 171 N. C. 540, 88 S. E. 782 (1916) (city does not
warrant streets to be absolutely safe) ; Duke v. Town of Belhaven, 174 N. C. 95,
93 S. E. 472 (1917); Willis v. City of New Bern, 191 N. C. 507, 132 S. E. 286
(1926) ; Speas v. City of Greensboro, 204 N. C. 239, 167 S. E. 807 (1933) (unlighted "silent policeman").
" Gunter v. Town of Sanford, 186 N. C. 452, 120 S. E. 41 (1923) ; Pickett v.
Carolina and Northwestern Railway, 200 N. C. 750, 158 S. E. 398 (1931) ; N. C.
CODE A~rN. (Michie, 1935) §3846 (j).
" Russell v. Town of Monroe, 116 N. C. 721, 21 S. E. 550 (1895) ; Revis v.
City of Raleigh, 150 N. C. 349, 63 S. E. 1049 (1909) (hole in sidewalk) ; Seagraves v. City of Winston, 170 N. C. 618, 87 S. E. 507 (1916) ; Rollins v. WinstonSalem, 176 N. C. 411, 97 S. E. 211 (1918) (no legal duty to light streets) ; Bailey
v. City of Asheville, 180 N. C. 645, 105 S. E. 326 (1920); Tinsley v. WinstonSalem, 192 N. C. 597, 135 S. E. 610 (1926) ; Gasque v. City of Asheville, 207 N.
C. 821, 178 S. E. 848 (1935) (city not insurer of safety).
" Bell v. City of Greensboro, 170 N. C. 179, 86 S. E. 1041 (1915) ; Carter v.
Town of Leaksville, 174 N. C. 561, 94 S. E. 6 (1917) ; Graham v. City of Charlotte, 186 N. C. 649, 120 S. E. 466 (1923) ; Michaux v. City of Rocky Mount, 193
N. C. 550, 137 S. E. 663 (1927).
"While a municipal corporation is not liable for the negligence of its jailers,
policemen or guards, it is liable lor failure to furnish reasonably comfortable
jails. Shields v. Town of Durham, 118 N. C. 450, 24 S. E. 794 (1896) (jail for
months had been in a very filthy, wet, and frozen condition) ; Coley v. City of
Statesville, 121 N. C. 301, 28 S. E. 482 (1897) ; see Moffitt v. City of Asheville,
103 N. C. 237, 9 S. E. 695 (1889); Nichols v. Town of Fountain, 165 N. C. 166,
80 S.E. 1059 (1914).
,"Powers held to be governmental or public in one jurisdiction are held to be
corporate or private in another, and it has often been said that it is impossible to
state a rule sufficiently exact to be of much practical value in deciding when a
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most frequently used to distinguish governmental from proprietary
functions are: the function is proprietary if it is maintained for revenues
and profit 21 of for the private advantage and benefit of the locality and

22
its inhabitants as contrasted with a benefit which enures to the state.
Often the profit test is clear and its application easy, but it is too indefinite to suffice in a number of situations. While an incidental profit
does not ordinarily change the character of a governmental function, 22
there is a conflict among the cases where the function is conducted in
part for profit and in part for public purposes. 24 In Pleasantsv. City
of Greensboro25 the North Carolina Supreme Court held the fact that a
portion of the city hall was rented for a profit did not change the maintenance of the building from a governmental to a proprietary function.
But what would the North Carolina court rule when a city gratuitously
collects ashes from its citizens but charges business establishments for
the same service, and a person is injured by a truck making collection
from both sources? Would the court deny recovery when an electrician
is electrocuted from a wire to a street light and at the same time allow
recovery if he comes in contact with a house line on the same pole?
What would be the result were he killed by the main trunk line carrying
current for both purposes? This profit test when carried to its logical
conclusion is hardly satisfactory.
The application of the test of private advantage and benefit to the

power is public and when -private." Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67,
241 Pac. 710 (1925) ; see Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill.
494, 101 N. E. 960,

962 (1913); Mayne v. Curtis, 73 Ind. App. 640, 126 N. E. 699, 701 (1920);

Hattiesburg v. Greigor, 118 Miss. 676, 79 So. 846, 847 (1918). For a discussion of
the confusion see, Borchard, Govenmient Liability in Tort (1925) 34 YALE L. J.
129; 4 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §1643. In South Carolina the court will not undertake to determine whether a function is governmental
or private but imposes liability for all functions in the absence of statutes. Irvine
v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911).
1 See Fisher v. City of New Bern, 140 N. C. 506, 512, 53 S. E. 342, 344 (1906);
Munich v. City of Durham, 181 N. C. 188, 195, 106 S. E. 665, 668 (1921). 6
MCQUILIN, MuNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS (2nd ed. 1928) §2795; ELLIOTT, MuNicPAL, CoR0oRATioNs (3rd ed. 1925) §339.
See Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 31 N. C. 74, 80 (1848); Hull
v. Town of Roxboro, 142 N. C. 454, 456, 55 S. E. 351, 352 (1906). 6 MCQUILLIN,
MuNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS (2nd ed. 1928) §2795; ELLIOrr, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1925) §333.
' Manning v. City of Pasadena, 58 Cal. 666, 209 Pac. 253 (1922) ; Taggart v.
City of Fall River, 170 Mass. 325, 49 N. E. 622 (1898) ; Bell v. City of Cincinnati,
80 Ohio St. 1, 88 N. E. 128 (1909) ; see Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225 Mass.
387, 114 N. E. 722, 724 (1917) ; Scibilia v. City of Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124
Atl. 273, 276 (1924).
Liability was imposed in the following cases: Judson v. Borough of Winstead, 80 Conn. 384, 68 Atl. 999 (1908); Moulton v. Town of Scarborough, 71
Me. 267 (1880) ; Oliver v. City of Worchester, 102 Mass. 489 (1869) ; Bell v.
City of Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. 185, 146 Atl. 567 (1929). Contra: Edgerly v. Concord,
62 N. H. 8 (1882) ; Buchanan v. Town of Barre, 66 Vt. 129, 28 Atl. 878 (1894).
192 N. C. 820, 135 S.E. 321 (1926).
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locality rather than to the state has led to many conflicting decisions and
many distinctions which appear groundless. To hold as of benefit to
the state, and thus a governmental function, the building or operation
of a drawbridge, 2 6 the maintenance of a city hall and other municipal
buildings, 27 flushing the streets,28 driving an ambulance, 29 maintaining a
city hospital,3 0 seems irreconcilable with holding as a benefit to the
locality the construction of sewers, 31 maintaining a city prison,3 2 sprinkling the streets 33 and the driving of an ash cart.34 Accepting the test at
its face value, it seems that that which is beneficial to a city must necessarily in part be beneficial to the state.
The inconsistencies of the courts can partially be explained by the
fact that the tests, while sufficient a century ago when first applied, are
today inadequate because of the ever increasing activity by both the
municipalities and the states and the complexities and demands of advancing civilization. Also, there has been much unfavorable comment
as to the equity of the immunity doctrine for governmental functions,35
and the courts whenever possible have tended to impose liability so as to
36
reach a just result.
'Evans v. City of Sheboygan, 153 Wis. 287, 141 N. W. 265 (1913).
Schwalls Adm. v. City of Louisville, 135 Ky. 570, 122 S. W. 860 (1909).
'Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U. S.650, 41 S. Ct. 610, 65 L. ed. 1146

(1921).

' Maximilian v. Mayor of New York, 62 N. Y. 160 (1875).
m'Tallefson v. City of Ottawa, 228 Ill. 134, 81 N. E. 823 (1907).
Ely v. City of St. Louis, 181 Mo. 723, 81 S.W. 168 (1904).
Edwards v. Town of Pocahontas, 47 Fed. 268 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1891).
McLeod v. City of Duluth, 53 S. D. 34, 218 N. W. 892 (1928).
Missano v. Mayor of New York, 160 N. Y. 123, 54 N. E. 744 (1899).
E. M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924-1925) 34 YAL, L. J. 1,
129, 229; Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort (1926-1927)
36 YALE L. J.1, 757, 1039; Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in
Tort (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 577, 734; L. W. Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a
Factorin the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases (1930) 78 U. or PA. L. RFv.
805, (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 742; E. B. Schulz, The Liability of Municipal Corporationsfor Torts in Pennsylvania (1936) 40 DIcK. L. REV. 1. Many states have
officially recognized the unfairness of the immunity doctrine and have extended
municipal liability by statutory enactment C. W. Tooke, Extension of Municipal
Liability in Tort (1932) 19 VA. L. REv. 97.
' "The cities, more and more, are entering into the economic life of their
citizens, and are now undertaking private enterprises formerly conducted by private corporations, often enterprises not essential to good government, but which
are more in the nature of convenience and places of amusement, and further since
the rule of non-liability of municipal corporations for torts is based on an analogy
to non-liability of the state for torts, the rule ought to be applied only when their
functions are similar to those of the state . . . there is to be observed a distinct
movement toward the doctrine that municipal corporations are under a duty of
exercising reasonable care in the maintenance of parks and other public enterprises of like character, which we think is the more wholesome and equitable
rule." Warden v. City of Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S.E. 375, 376, 378 (1925) ;
in Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72, 77 (1919) (city
was held liable for negligence of fire engine returning from a fire, and Judge
Wanamaker, concurring, stated, "The whole doctrine of immunity given to a sovereign state was based upon the assumption of the divine right of kings-a king
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For classification as either governmental or proprietary, municipal
maintenance of parks and playgrounds has fallen midway, and is commonly said to be in the "twilight zone." Early cases and the greater
weight of authority hold their maintenance to be a governmental function,3 7 justifying such position by saying that their essential value is the
promotion of health, education, and social improvement, since they
afford recreation, exercise, pleasure, and diversion; further, that their
beneficial nature is not confined to the limits of the municipality. The
minority view, as set out in more recent decisions, looking to the hardships which result from the denial of a recovery to the injured persons,
rules that parks and playgrounds are a proprietary function and imposes
liability on the following grounds: (1) that the benefits of such activities are limited to the particular locality;38 (2) that parks are private
and exclusive property of the city, the city having absolute management
and control thereof ;39 (3) that the laws fixing municipal liability as to
streets and highways are applicable to parks and playgrounds ;40 (4) that
as park establishment is permissive, rather than mandatory, the municipality is not an agent of the state when it exercises this permissive
41
power.
can do no wrong; he is infallible; or if he do wrong no subject has any right to
complain. This doctrine has been shot to death on so many different battlefields
that it would seem utter folly now to resurrect it."
m Meyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 49 P. (2d) 893 (Cal. 1935)
(miniature train) ; Cornelisen v. City of Atlanta, 146 Ga. 416, 91 S. E. 415 (1917) ;
Hendricks v. Urbana Park Dist., 265 Ill. App. 102 (1932) (swimming pool); Warren v. City of Topeka, 125 Kan. 524, 265 Pac. 78 (1928) (swimming pool) ; Board
of Park Commissioners v. Prinz, 127 Ky. 468, 105 S. W. 948 (1907); Bolster v.
City of Lawrence, 225 Mass. 837, 114 N. E. 722 (1917) (swimming pool); Heino
v. City of Grand Rapids, 202 Mich. 363, 168 N. W. 512 (1918) (swimming pool);
St. John v. City of St. Paul, 179 Minn. 12, 228 N. W. 170 (1929) (bathing beach);
Toft v. City of Lincoln, 125 Neb. 497, 250 N. W. 748 (1933) (artificial lake);
Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 78 Atl. 196 (1910) ; Blair v. Granger, 24
R. I. 17, 51 At]. 1042 (1902) ; Mayor and City Council of Nashville v. Burns, 131
Tenn. 281, 174 S. W.1111 (1915) (swing) ; Vanderford v. City of Houston, 286
S. W. 568 (Tex. 1926) (wading pool); Adler v. Salt Lake City, 64 Utah, 568,
231 Pac. 1102 (1924) (collapse of a tier of seats) ; Stuver v. City of Auburn, 171
Wash. 76, 17 P. (2d) 614 (1932) (merry-go-round) ; Virovatz v. City of Cudahy,
211 Wis. 357, 247 N. W. 341 (1933) (lake); see City of Hartford v. Maslen, 76
Conn. 599, 57 Atl. 740 (1904).
8Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928) ; Paraska
v. City of Scranton, 313 Pa. 227, 169 Atl. 434 (1933) (swing) ; Warden v. City of
Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S. E. 375 (1925) (slide).
Caion City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133 Pac. 1040 (1913) (merry-go-round);
Sarber v. City of Indianapolis, 72 Ind. App. 594, 126 N. E. 330 (1920) ; Ramirez
v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710 (1925) (swing).
40Pennell v. City of Wilmington, 23 Del. 229, 78 Atl. 915 (1906) ; Thayer v.
City of St. Joseph, 54 S. W. (2d) 442 (Mo. 1932) ; Narberg v. Hagna, 46 S. D.
568, 195 N. W. 438 (1923) (swimming pool) ; Hain v. City of Lynchburg, 181
S. E. 285 (Va. 1935) (swimming pool).
' Boise Development Co. v. Boise City, 30 Idaho 675, 167 Pac. 1032 (1917);
Capps v. City of St. Louis, 252 Mo. 345, 158 S. W. 616 (1913). South Carolina
imposes liability by statute. Haithcock v. City of Columbia, 115 S. C. 29, 104 S. E.
335 (1920).
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Logically, and considering the similarity between park maintenance
and the maintenance of health and schools, which are practically unanimously held to be governmental functions, the governmental classification seems to be the sounder of the two views if the distinction between
governmental and proprietary function is to be strictly followed. However, as the immunity doctrine is apparently inequitable, as shown by
the tendency of the courts to impose liability wherever possible, the imposition of liability by statutory enactment, and the opinions of writers
on the subject, it appears that substantial justice will be more satisfactorily served if the Supreme Court of North Carolina rules the maintenance of a park a proprietary function.
S. J. STERN, JR.
Negotiable Instruments-Payment-Cashier's Check.
Defendant, manufacturer of motor cars, notified plaintiff-distributor
that "driveaways" must be settled for by cashier's check before the cars
would be delivered. Dealer, ordering through plaintiff, procured
cashier's check payable to defendant and delivered same to defendant
coincident with delivery of cars. The account of distributor was
credited with the amount of the check which was deposited with promptness in a Wisconsin bank for collection; thence it was sent to a Federal
Reserve Bank and then to drawee bank. Drawee stamped check paid,
charged the amount on its own books against its deposit with the Reserve Bank, and sent a credit memorandum to the latter bank which
failed to credit same to drawee's account. Drawee became insolvent,
and after successive charges back by the banks to its account, defendant
charged the amount of the cashier's check back to plaintiff. Held, the
check constituted payment.1
With the exception of a few jurisdictions2 the authorities are
unanimous in support of the rule that the giving of a bank check by a
debtor for the payment of his indebtedness to the payee is not, in the
absence of an express or implied agreement to that effect, a payment or
discharge of the debt. There is a presumption that the check is accepted
on condition that it be paid, and the debt is not discharged until the
check is paid or until it is accepted at the bank at which it is made payable. 3 The reason sometimes assigned is that the paper is given and
Nash Motors Co. v. J. M. Harrison and Co., 183 S. E. 202 (Ga. 1935).
v. White, 132 Iowa, 327, 109 N. W. 909 (1906) (a contrary rule has been
announced in Massachusetts, Maine, and Indiana where the giving of a check,
note, or draft for a debt or obligation to pay money is held to operate as a payment
or extinguishment of the obligation).
Ketcham v. Hines, 29 Ga. App. 627, 116 S. E. 225 (1923) (bank checks are
not payment until themselves paid, without an express agreement that they are to
be accepted as such); Dille v. White, 132 Iowa 327, 109 N. W. 909 (1906);
-Dille

